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CASE NO. 13798 
REPLY BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
I. 
POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT ADDRESS 
THE DISPOSITIVE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL (THE EN-
FORCEABILITY OF THE UNIVERSITY'S CONTRACT WITH 
APPELLANT TO SUPPLY BROKERAGE SERVICES); THE 
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM MUST BE REVERSED. 
The various arguments set forth in Respondent's Brief under 
Point I, occupying 36 pages, simply missed the target and are 
not relevant to the dispositive issue on this appeal. In that 
section of its Brief, Respondent seeks to persuade this Court 
that the security purchase and sale transactions engaged in by 
the University are ultra vires, and hence voidable. As amici 
curiae point out under Point I of their opening brief at pages 
5 through 11, a finding that such transactions were ultra vires 
to the University would not be a defense to Appellant's claims 
here. Even assuming, contrary to the law, that such trans-
actions were ultra vires, any rights or remedies arising or flow-
ing therefrom would repose in the parties to the transactions. 
The record affirmatively shows that First Equity acted only as 
an agent of the University, carefully and faithfully carrying out 
specific instructions given by its principal - the University. 
(R. 140-49, 247)* 
Respondent addresses the real issue here — the validity 
and enforceability of the agency contract between the University 
and Appellant — only tangentially in the extension of the argu-
ment contained in what is labeled Appendix A attached to the Brief. 
There, Respondent argues that the University has power "only" by 
"contract" to supervise the erection of college buildings, to 
adopt plans, drawings and specifications for those buildings, 
and to make all purchases and contracts for the buildings."(See 
Appendix A(2) to Respondent's Brief). 
We submit that this argument is specious, for if valid, 
the University could not contractually bind itself to employ a 
President and other administrative officers to plan, direct and 
control what transpired in those "buildings" or to purchase the 
Respondent does not challenge this fact, but curiously adds 
that with respect to other transactions not the subject of 
this litigation First Equity did not act as the University's 
agent. (Respondent's Brief at p. 8). . 
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myriad of supplies and services necessary to operate a Univer-
sity. If Appellant's argument were held to be valid, it would 
place in jeopardy the salary of every employee and the fee of 
every consultant and supplier of services employed or retained 
by the University. If any one of them, at the specific direc-
tion and under order of the University, were to execute an act 
ultra vires to the University, and all within the scope of his 
employment, he could not collect his salary or fee. 
Such is not and should not be the law. As between the 
principal and its agent, such a risk is borne by the principal 
(see opening brief of amici curiae, Point I). Respondent seeks 
to circumvent this universally accepted rule of agency law by 
grasping in desperation at those cases holding that, as between 
an agent and the adverse party to the transaction, the agent is 
liable for his own action. We do not quarrel with that doc-
trine. Indeed, it will make the other agents of the University 
(Mr. Catron, the Institutional Council and the Board of Trustees) 
who authorized or ratified the service contract between the 
University and Appellant liable to Appellant if the University 
escapes liability on an ultra vires theory. However, the doc-
trine of these cases does not apply because the Respondent has 
not asserted that the Appellant, its agent, has breached its 
duty to the Respondent or to any third party. Nor is there 
anything in the record which even suggests that Appellant 
breached that duty. Appellant has fulfilled its duty to the 
University by carefully following the University's instruc-
tions and is entitled to compensation for its services. Assum-
-3-
ing arguendo,that those underlying transactions were ultra 
vires, the University is, nonetheless, liable to its own agent, 
the Appellant, for the fees which it agreed to pay for the 
services which were rendered to the University by the Appellant. 
II. 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, RESPONDENT IS 
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO 
THE AGREEMENTS HERE INVOLVED WITH FIRST EQUITY 
CORPORATION FOR THE SUPPLYING OF BROKERAGE 
SERVICES. 
In POINT II of the brief of amici curiae, an argument 
is set forth that the University is estopped from asserting 
that the contracts complained of were ultra vires. Respondent's 
reply commencing at page 43 of its opening brief asserts that 
the cases and authorities cited and relied upon by amici curiae 
are inapposite. This conclusion is bottomed entirely upon the 
continuing assumption of Respondent that the underlying securi-
ties purchase transactions were "ultra vires." From this assump-
tion is bootstrapped another, namely, that since the purchase 
transactions were ultra vires, the agreement of the University 
to pay for brokerage services is also ultra vires. As we argue 
at Point I of this brief, supra, the second assumption does 
not follow the first, even assuming, arguendo, the validity of 
the first. When the second assumption falls, as it must, the 
entire underpinning for this portion of Respondent's brief col-
lapses and it becomes clear that the doctrine of estoppel applies 
under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
However, assuming, arguendo, the validity of the assump-
tion that both the underlying purchase transaction and the agree-
- - " '•"" " " "' - A -
ment between the University and First Equity Corporation for 
the providing of brokerage services were found to be "ultra 
vires," Respondent's argument, nonetheless, is not valid. 
The benchmark case of this Court on this subject is Wall vs. 
Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P.766 (1917). That case has 
not been reversed nor has the doctrine there announced been 
changed by this Court in subsequent cases. That case was a 
much weaker case for the application of an estoppel doctrine 
against*a governmental body than is the case at bar because, 
there, the City was acting purely in its "governmental" capacity. 
By contrast, here, the University was acting in its proprietary 
capacity, dealing as an investor and entering into a contract 
for the provision of designated services. This Court in Wall 
at page 6 04 recognized this vital difference in governmental 
action, and the legal consequences thereof, by citing and quot-
ing with approval 3 Dillon, Mun. Corps. (5th Ed.) Sec. 1194 
which in pertinent part states: 
Municipal corporations, as we have seen, are 
regarded as having, in some respects, a double 
character, one public, the other (by way of 
distinction) private. As respects property 
not held for public use, or upon public trust, 
and as respects contracts and rights of a pri-
vate nature, there is no reason why such cor-
porations should not fall within limitation 
statutes, and be affected by them unless 
excluded from them. . . . 
Despite this distinction and the fact that in Wall 
plaintiff sought to cut off the rights of the City to a public 
street, the Court imposed upon the City the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais. In so doing, it recognized that this was the doctrine 
to be applied only in special circumstances, stating at page 601: 
(Referring to cases holding that estoppel does 
not apply such as those cited by Respondent): 
None of them present a case like this, where the 
municipality, by its own affirmative acts, declar-
ations, and conduct, misled the party, or induced 
him to believe that he had the right to rely upon 
the assurances which the municipality, after a long 
period of time, sought to repudiate to his injury. 
Indeed, it is hardly to be expected that many cases, 
if any at all, can be found in the published report 
similar to the case at bar. It will be found upon 
examination that many of the cases above cited 
placed emphasis upon the fact that the municipality 
did not do anything affirmatively to mislead the 
party claiming the right to the ground in dispute. 
[Emphasis added] 
It is difficult to imagine language that more nicely fits 
the facts and circumstances of this case, and, in addition, we 
are here talking about a simple contract for brokerage services 
which clearly falls within the ambit of proprietary, not govern-
mental, action. The court in Wall then stated at page 607: 
We believe, as was said by the Court in City of 
Sullivan v. Tichnor, supra, cited by appellant, 
that: 
"A municipal corporation can no more profit 
by fraud upon property owners than an indi-
vidual and may be estopped by conduct." 
Or, as said by Judge Dillon, in note one to the sec-
tion above quoted, referring to the character of 
acts necessary to constitute an estoppel: 
"The principle of estoppel in pais has 
been applied to exceptional cases where 
the elements calling for its exercise appear 
to have been an abandonment of the public 
use for the prescriptive period, inclosure 
and expensive improvements, such as large 
and costly buildings, or acts of the munici-
pality inducing the abutter to believe that 
there is no longer any street, and the expen-
diture of money in reliance upon the acts of 
the municipality. The absolute bona fides 
of the abutter or adverse possessor is a most 
important factor where an estoppel in pais is 
claimed. The acts relied on must be of such 
character as to amount to a fraud, if the 
city were permitted to claim otherwise." 
We hold that this case falls within the excep-
tional class of cases referred to by Judge 
Dillon, and that it is the duty of the Court 
to decide it as "right and justice require." 
It is our opinion that the City is estopped 
from claiming the premises in question as a 
public street. [Emphasis by the Court] 
We respectfully assert that this doctrine is here appli-
cable. It is difficult to conceive of clearer action on the 
part of the University to induce action on the part of its 
agent pursuant to the agency contract. The same was accom-
plished by the ritual of a formal resolution. (R. 137-38$ 151). 
First Equity Corporation acted in good faith, advancing its 
own funds, and performing requested services in precisely the 
manner designated by the University. "Right and justice require" 
the imposition of the doctrine of estoppel. Indeed, as was true 
in Wall, to permit the University to escape responsibility for 
its contract under the facts on this record would permit it to 
"profit by fraud." It should not be permitted so to do. 
In Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 
(1941), this Court discussed Wall at length. This Court cited 
with approval, relied upon and followed the reasoning in Wall 
to the facts then before it, though after "balancing the 
justices of the cause," the Court refrained from applying the 
doctrine in the Tooele City case stating at page 494: 
In the case at bar, the consideration given the 
city by Elkington was small, if anything; the 
deed was made in contravention of the statute; 
there is no evidence that the property has been 
assessed against the defendants or their pre-
decessor in interest; the time element is short; 
and there was not a replatting or a change in 
the whole neighborhood to the benefit of all 
adjacent landowners. 
In its opening brief, Respondent relies primarily upon 
a Federal decision, Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande Western.R. Co, , 
156 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1946), as"modifying the doctrine enun-
ciated in Wall and Tooele City. Respondent's position is not 
valid because: 
a) In Provo City, the court specifically found 
(156 F.2d at 712) that the defendant Railroad had full knowledge 
of the underlying facts and hence was not in a position to invoke 
the doctrine of estoppel in pais in any event. 
b) In Provo City, the City was clearly acting in 
its governmental capacity, as contrasted with the University's 
proprietary contract which Appellant here seeks to enforce. 
c) The Court of Appeals in Provo City restricted 
the application of its opinion to estoppel applied against "a 
fcity in respect of its right to reopen a street for use of a 
public thoroughfare" and recognized that the doctrine would apply 
in "peculiar circumstances" such as those presented in Wall. 
Furthermore, a vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Judge 
Phillips which asserted that the majority opinion misconstrued 
and misapplied both Wall and Elkington. 
d) Finally, Provo City was a case in the Federal 
courts. As the court specifically found in Provo City, the 
Federal Court is without constitutional power under the teach-
ings of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 
82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 ALR 1487 (1938),to change existing Utah law 
in any way. Its only function was to construe and apply the sub-
stantive law of the State of Utah as enunciated by this Court. 
We respectfully submit from the foregoing that the 
cases and authorities set forth in the opening brief of amici 
curiae are here controlling and that the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais should be imposed against the University. This is 
particularly true with respect to such unappropriated funds 
as "grants, gifts, devises, bequests," "dedicated credits" 
and "tuitions, fees and Federal grants" with respect to which 
the Legislature in the most clear and unambiguous fashion has 
delegated to the University the authority to "convert" and 
"invest". (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-32-4 (1970),discussed infra). 
How could the University receive a gift of common stock and 
proceed to convert and reinvest proceeds from such conversion 
without employing the services of a broker? The University 
obviously had the power to employ a broker and should be estopped 
from denying the same under the peculiar facts and circumstances 
demonstrated by this record. The judgment appealed from should 
be reversed. 
III. 
THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES PURCHASE AND SALES 
TRANSACTIONS WERE NOT ULTRA VIRES; THE JUDG-
MENT APPEALED FROM MUST BE REVERSED. 
The bulk of Respondent's brief is devoted to argument 
that the securities transactions in which Appellant acted as 
Respondent's agent broker were ultra vires. The argument is 
grounded upon two erroneous assumptions: 
a) That neither the Utah Constitution nor enactments 
of the Territorial or State Legislatures delegate to the Univer-
sity power to purchase and sell common stocks, and; 
*
f
 b) That Utah Code Annotated, Sections 33-1-1 and 
33-1-3 constitute "enabling" legislation, are the only reposi-
tory of University authority to purchase securities and con-
stitute an absolute prohibition against purchasing any security 
not on the statutory list contained in Section 33-1-1, 
It does not appear to us that either of these assumptions 
is valid. 
1. At all times here pertinent, the University was em-
powered to invest both appropriated and non-appropriated funds 
in common stocks. 
A. Appropriated Funds. Pertinent portions of the 
Territorial enactments, the Constitutional provisions and sub-
sequently enacted statutes by the State Legislature are quoted 
and discussed in the Brief of amici curiae under POINT IV at 
pages 15-22 of their opening brief. We will not restate them 
here. However, by way of summary, we invite the attention of 
the Court to the following general grants of authority histori-
cally given to the University which apply to appropriated funds 
as well as most other property that falls into the hands of the 
University. 
(i). Comp. Laws of Utah 1888, Section 1855. The 
University was established by the Territorial Legislature as a 
common law trust. The Trustees were given "general control and 
supervision" over "all appropriations", subject only to the pro-
viso that their action shall be "not inconsistent with the laws 
of the Territory." 
-in-
(2) Utah Constitution, Art. 10, Sec. 4. The Con-
stitution specifically provides that all of the rights con-
ferred upon the University by the Territorial Legislature 
"are hereby perpetuated." 
(3) 1929 Session Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 2; Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 53-32-2 (1953), In 1929, the Utah Legislature 
reiterated the perpetuation of all such rights theretofore 
"granted or conferred" and further provided that the Univer-
sity :"may sue and be sued and contract and be contracted with" 
and "may take, hold, lease, sell and convey real and personal 
property as the interests of the dollege may require." 
(4) 1929 Session Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 3; Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 53-32-3 (1953). The same Legislature, in the follow-
ing Section provided specifically that the University may 
"bring and maintain actions to recover, protect and preserve 
property and rights of the university and to enforce any con-
tract relating thereto." 
(5) 1929 Session Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 4; Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 53-32-4 (1953). In the next section, the same Legi-
slature authorized the University to "take by purchase, grant, 
gift, devise or bequest any real or personal property for the 
use of any department of the college and for any purpose appro-
priate to the object of the University." It also provided that 
the University "may convert property" and that property received 
by the University may be "held, invested and managed and the 
proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees for the purposes 
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and under the conditions prescribed in the grant or donation." 
(6) Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-48-10(5) (1953). In 
1969, the Legislature also reiterated the general power of 
the University to "handle its own financial affairs under the 
general supervision of the board." 
We respectfully submit that these various statutory pro-
visions conferred upon the University very broad discretionary 
investment powers which included the authority to invest in 
common stocks. Throughout Respondent's Brief, it is asserted 
that the Legislature could not have so intended for it would 
permit the University to engage in gross speculative endeavors. 
This is not true. It will be recalled that the University was 
established by the Territorial Legislature as a common law trust 
and all of the.common law and statutory restrictions upon actions 
of such fiduciaries tethered the investment policy of the Univer-
sity. Furthermore, the Territorial Legislature specifically 
reserved the right to enact subsequent laws to correct or con-
trol any abuses by requiring that all control and supervision 
over appropriations must not be "inconsistent with the laws of 
the Territory." These provisions were perpetuated and expanded 
upon by the Constitution and subsequent statutes. The Legisla-
ture, in its wisdom, did not see fit to impose specific restric-
tions upon the investment policy of the University until enact-
ment of the State Money Management Act on February 2, 1974 (Utah 
Code Ann. Sections 51-7-1, et. seq.
 f Supp. 1975). 
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Respondent relies heavily upon University of Utah v. 
Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 
348 (1956). Its reliance upon that case is not here apropos. 
As Respondent asserts in its brief, "the University of Utah" 
there was contending that "it was completely free from the 
control of the Legislature, administrative bodies, commissions, 
agencies and officers of the State." Amici curiae make no such 
contention in this case. They assert that the Legislature may 
control the kinds and types of investments made by the Univer-
sity. However, the Legislature refrained from so acting until 
enactment of the State Money Management Act in 197 4 (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 51-7-1 et. seq. (1953)). 
The opinion of Judge Aldon J. Anderson in State of Utah 
v. duPont Walston, Inc. (f74-f75 Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
1(94812 (D. Utah, Oct. 1, 1974) reflects that virtually identi-
cal arguments were asserted by Respondent in an action in the 
United States District Court against duPont Walston, Inc. as 
are set forth in its brief before this Court. After reviewing 
Respondent's arguments and the Territorial, Constitutional and 
legislative enactments discussed above, Judge Anderson com-
mented in that case at page 96,716: 
The Court has serious concerns with plaintiffs1 
[The State of Utah and Utah State University] 
theory [that the University does not have power 
to invest in common stocks]for it does not 
appear that the Utah Code Ann. Sec. 33-1-1 (1966) 
is an enabling statute which clearly sets forth 
the investment guidelines for State universities. 
-13-
B. Unappropriated Funds, In POINT I, Subpoint B, 
Respondent asserts that "Judge Christofferson did not find a 
triable issue of fact in granting USUfs cross motion." (Respond-
ent's Brief, p. 35). This assertion by Respondent and the argu-
ment in aid thereof simply does not square with the record in 
this proceeding. As amici curiae point out in POINT III of 
their Brief, at pages 14-15, the Court below did indeed recog-
nize such "triable issue of fact." 
Judge Christofferson first made a legal assumption that 
"there was authority for the university to invest those [grant 
or contract] funds." (R. 258). He then stated that "there is 
at least a triable issue of fact whether USU . . . had funds 
which it had received from individual grants or development con-
tracts sufficient to pay for all or part of said stock." (R. 435B) 
In argument Respondent seeks to bifurcate the action of the 
Court below and ignore a portion of the record before this Court. 
(Respondent's Brief at pp. 35, et. seq.) The Court below was not 
at liberty so to act for Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires the Court to consider all matters of record 
in disposing of a motion for summary judgment. The existence of 
this triable issue of fact alone clearly requires reversal of the 
judgment appealed from. 
We also invite the attention of the Court to the fact that 
the "assumption" of the Court below that "there was authority for 
the University to invest those funds" was a correct assumption. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-3-4 (1953) enacted in 1929 and still in 
force specifically authorizes the University in its "corporate 
capacity" to take by purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest any 
property, real or personal, to "convert" the same "into other 
property" and to invest and manage the same. The Indiana 
Supreme Court in Sendak v. Trustees of Indiana University, 
254 Ind. 390, 260 N.E. 2d 601 (1970) resolved an identical 
issue, holding that the Board of Trustees, under a near identi-
cal statute, was empowered to invest such funds in common stocks. 
The Sendak court held: 
1) That the State of Indiana was not the owner of 
gifts from private donors to the University of Indiana Board 
of Trustees; 
2) That the Board of Trustees of Indiana University 
acts in a dual capacity as Directors of the University opera-
tions and as common law Trustees of private trusts created for 
the benefit of the University by private donors; and 
3) That the Board of Trustees was authorized to 
make and hold investments in common stock of private corpora-
tions out of money received from private sources. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Indiana Court stated: 
The property with which we are concerned was not 
given to the State of Indiana. Thus, the State 
of Indiana is not the owner of the gifts from the 
private donors to the trustees. They were given 
in trust upon certain limitations and specifica-
. tions. To say that they became the property of 
the State of Indiana would be a violation of the 
trust imposed upon the trustees pursuant to the 
statute under which they are authorized to accept 
such funds. The trustees have a duty and obli-
gation, as trustees have in a private trust, to 
use good judgment and prudence in the management 
of the funds entrusted to them and to keep them 
properly and prudently invested, with due regard 
to enhancing the income, as far as the same may 
be reasonably and safely done. The mere fact 
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that the trustees happen to act in another 
capacity and are a corporate body affected with 
a public interest does not prohibit them from 
also acting as trustees of private funds, parti-
cularly in this case, where the statute speci-
fically authorizes such activity. It is true 
that the property here involved has certain public 
or charitable purposes, but that does not make 
the State of Indiana the owner of such funds any 
more than the State of Indiana is the owner of 
funds placed in trust with some other private 
trustee for the same purposes, namely, educational 
purposes at Indiana University. [260 N.E. 2d at 
603] 
The principles applied by the Indiana Supreme Court in the 
Sendak case should be applied in this case by this Court. 
Section 53-48-10(4) (1953) authorizes the University to 
manage and control funds classified as "dedicated credits such 
as tuitions, fees" and "Federal grants" for use in institutional 
work programs. Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 53-48-20 (1953) like-
wise authorizes the University to accept "contributions, grants 
or gifts from any private organization, company, firm, industry 
or individual, or any governmental agency" and to "retain, accumu-
late, invest, commit and expend" funds so received. 
It follows from the foregoing that the University at the 
time here pertinent had authority delegated by the State Legisla-
ture, which authority in earlier years had been delegated by the 
Territorial Legislature, to invest its appropriated funds in 
common stocks. 
Further, it appears to us to be clear beyond reasonable 
As we have previously noted in Points I and II, supra, the exist-
ence of this authority is not relevant to disposing of the 
issues now before this Court. We comment and argue herein 
only in response to the lengthy argument set forth in Respond-
ent's Brief. 
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dispute that the University was empowered to, invest non-
appropriated funds .in common stocks. The Court below so 
recognized and reserved this issue of fact. It was the 
burden of the moving party, the University, to establish on 
the record this missing link to sustain a motion for summary 
judgment. The judgment granting the University's motion for 
summary judgment must be reversed. 
2. Sections 31-1-1 and 31-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
constitute neither investment "enabling" statutes nor a 
statutory prohibition against investment in properties not 
specifically stated on the approved statutory list. 
The complete text of Section 31-1-1 (1953), Utah Code 
Annotated, is set forth in the Appendix to the opening brief 
of amici curiae. It applies with equal force and effect to 
"any private, political, or public instrumentality, body, cor-
poration or person." It neither explicitly nor by implication 
constitutes an initial grant of power to such public or private 
corporations or persons to invest in specific properties; nor 
does it explicitly or by implication constitute an exclusive 
list of properties in which public and private corporations 
and persons may invest. Section 33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
specifically provides: 
The provisions of this Act are supplemental to 
any and all other laws relating to and declar-
ing what shall be legal investments for the 
persons, corporations . . . referred to in this 
Act. . . . [Emphasis added] 
And, as is pointed out at pages 21-3 of the opening brief of 
amici curiae, the State Money Management Act enacted on February 
2, 1974 (Utah Code Ann. §51-7-1, et. seq. (1953)) for the 
first time imposes specific legislative restraints on invest-
ment in common stock by the University. All inconsistent 
sections of the Utah statutes were specifically repealed by 
that Act. Respondent in its brief so admits and affirmatively 
asserts at page 34: 
Indeed the Act specifically amends any pre-existing 
sections of the Code dealing with the deposit and 
investment of public funds (e.g. Sec. 65-1-65). 
The Legislature expressly stated that the purpose of that 
Act was "to establish and maintain" a continuing state-wide 
policy for the deposit and investment of public funds. (Utah 
Code Ann. §51-7-2(b) (Supp. 1975)). Since Section 31-1-1 is 
neither "enabling" nor "prohibitory", the Legislature had no 
reason to and did not amend that section when it established such 
policy by enacting the Money Management Act. 
It follows that neither of the basic premises underpinning 
Respondent's "no power" argument is sound. Not until the enact-
ment of the State Money Management Act were the restrictions 
which Respondent claims flow from Section 31-1-1 enacted into 
law by the Legislature. At the time of the investments here at 
issue, the State was empowered by statute to invest in common 
stocks. Section 31-1-1 did not and does not now impair that 
power. The judgment appealed from should be reversed. 
IV. 
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTED DEFENSE OF "REVOCATION 
OF AUTHORITY" IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN FACT OR 
IN LAW; THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM MUST BE 
REVERSED. 
In argument commencing at page 57 of Respondent's Brief, 
the University asserts that the action of the Court below should 
be affirmed because "USU had withdrawn from Catron any autho-
rity it had previously conferred upon him of which fact First 
Equity had notice." Respondent reaches this conclusion by 
a curious and erroneous pyramiding of inferences. The first 
inference is that "either First Security Bank or Walker Bank, 
or both of them" were put on inquiry as to Catron's authority 
by virtue of reading newspaper reports that the "Attorney 
General's office believed it was illegal for USU to purchase 
stock." Respondent does not advise the Court as to how notice 
of such Attorney General's belief on the legality of Univer-
sity action related in any way to revocation of specific 
authorizations from USU to Mr. Catron. Second, the Court is 
asked to infer that from such notice, First Security Bank and 
Walker Bank were saddled with a duty to investigate to deter-
mine whether or not Catron's authority had been revoked. Third, 
the Court is asked to infer that such inquiry would have 
resulted in a declaration by the University that Catron had no 
authority. Next, the Court is asked to infer that both of the 
banks involved had been retained by Appellant and were acting 
as its agents, not the agents of the University. Finally, the 
Court is asked to infer that such knowledge,synthesized through 
this chain of inferences,somehow was imputable to Appellant. 
We assert that this entire argument is wholly without merit. 
None of the authorities cited would justify the result claimed. 
The uncontroverted facts are: 
1. The Institutional Council by formal resolution speci-
fically authorized Mr. Catron to represent and bind the Univer-
sity in the purchase and sale of securities. The formal 
resolution further provided that he and other designated 
officers of the University may bind the University by giving 
"written or verbal instruction to the brokers concerning the 
herein named transactions" and finally " [t]hat this resolution 
shall be and remain in full force and effect until written 
notice of the revocation hereof shall be delivered to the 
brokers." (R. 106, 137-8). 
2. The record contains no evidence that written notice 
of revocation was ever given to Appellant. 
3. The record contains no evidence that oral revoca-
tion was given to Appellant. 
4. The record contains no evidence that any representa-
tive of Appellant was advised of the newspaper articles relied 
upon by Respondent or that Appellant received any information 
whatsoever that would put it on notice of any revocation of 
authority conferred by the formal resolution of the Institutional 
Council. 
5. First Security Bank and Walker Bank were selected 
and designated by Mr. Catron, not by Appellant. All of the deal-
ings by Appellant with either of those banks was at the direction 
and instruction of Catron. (R. 363, Paragraphs 28-29). 
We respectfully submit that this argument forwarded by 
Respondent is without merit and that the judgment appealed from 
must be reversed. 
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V. 
THE CLAIMED VIOLATION OF "REGULATION T" 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGAL DEFENSE TO THE 
CLAIMS ASSERTED BY APPELLANT; THE JUDGMENT 
APPEALED FROM MUST BE REVERSED. 
The Respondent likewise cannot prosper under the 
various arguments set forth under Point II of its opening 
brief. In those arguments, Respondent claims that First 
Equity violated Regulation T promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve Board and that such violation constitutes a defense 
to Appellant's claims. The Court below erroneously so held. 
The proper interpretation to be afforded Regulation T is 
clearly a question of Federal law. Subsequent to the filing 
of Respondent's brief herein, the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah entered Memorandum Opinion and order 
through which claims of the University asserted against other 
brokers on identical transactions were dismissed with preju-
dice. As is apparent from the Memorandum Opinion and Order 
which is reproduced for the convenience of this Court herein 
as Appendix A, Respondent made the same arguments and cited 
the same cases before the United States District Court as are 
contained in its opening brief before this Court. On Motions 
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
the Federal Court rejected the claims as a matter of law. The 
Federal Court held that following the adoption by the Federal 
Reserve Board of "Regulation X" (designated to regulate the 
obtaining of credit by a borrower - the University here), any 
theretofore implied 
right of action on the part of a borrower against an extender 
of credit (the Appellant here) for the latter's violation of 
Regulation T was extinguished. The Federal Court also denied 
any such right of action on the part of the University on the 
additional grounds of an "in pari delicto" defense, and that 
any implied right of action would not inure to an institutional 
investor such as the University. In so ruling, the Federal 
Court stated in part at pages 10-12: 
Both Regulations T and X were promulgated under 
Section 7 of the 1934 Act and the purposes of 
both regulations are aimed at realizing or stab-
ilizing a desirable macroeconomic goal of Con-
gress rather than the protection of investors. 
While an implied right of action under Regulation 
T has been granted by some courts, the promulga-
tion of Regulation X and the facts of this case 
put the issue of the interface of the two regula-
tions directly before the court. Regarding the 
status of the private right of action in light of 
the interface, at least four different results can 
be suggested: (1) The basis for a private damage 
action for violation of Regulation T has been 
undermined and canceled out by the amendment of 
section 7 of the 19 34 Act and the promulgation of 
Regulation X thereunder for the reason that in the 
past under Regulation T the broker shouldered the 
entire responsibility for compliance with the 
margin requirements, but Regulation X now puts the 
responsibility equally upon the investor. (2) The 
private right of action survives in the face of 
the promulgation of Regulation X; however, Regula-
tion X provides an in pari delicto or equal fault 
defense in an action by an investor that the court 
or jury can manipulate in making a determination as 
to the degree of culpability of each party. (3) The 
private right of action survives in the face of pro-
mulgation of Regulation X, unless the investor has 
wilfully and intentionally tried to evade the pro-
visions of the margin requirements. (4) The private 
right of action survives in the face of the promul-
gation of Regulation X and a broker can expose him-
self to almost strict liability for a violation of 
Regulation T for the reason that someone should be 
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saddled with the responsibility of assuring 
compliance with the margin requirements and 
the broker is in the best posture to do this. 
The In pari delicto defense would be denied 
under this approach for the reason that pri-
vate suits serve an important enforcement func-
tion and this enforcement purpose would dis-
allow an in pari delicto defense in the securi-
ties area as it has been disallowed in the anti-
trust area. 
The court is of the opinion that, as outlined in 
the first alternative, the promulgation of Regu-
lation X has removed the necessary legal under-
pinning for implying a private right of action 
•for a violation of the margin requirements, and 
that Regulation X cancels out the private right 
of action implied under Regulation T. As a 
matter of law, therefore, Count V in the com-
plaints which alleges a violation of Regulation 
T should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. Further, 
however, the court is of the opinion that the 
motions for summary judgment would have to be 
granted in favor of defendants for other reasons 
under the facts of these cases.* 
It follows that the Court below erred in dismissing 
Appellant's complaint because of non-compliance by Appellant 
with the requirements of Regulation T and the judgment here 
appealed from must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
The court then proceeded to state supplemental grounds for 
dismissing the University's cause with prejudice, namely (1) 
the University is an "institutional investor" beyond any con-
ceivable protection of Regulation T within the intent of 
Congress; and (2) after the promulgation of Regulation X, 
an in pari delicto defense would defeat any claim of the 
University founded upon Regulation T. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, 
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v. 
BEAR, STEARNS & CO., a 
corporation, 
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UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, 
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v. 
BLYTH EASTMAN DILLON & CO., 
INC., a corporation, 
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UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, 
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v. 
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN & COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
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NC 74-39 
NC 74-40 
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UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI- : 
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and : 
corporate, 
Plaintiff, 
: NC 74-41 
v. 
HARRIS, UPHAM AND CO., INC., 
Defendant. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI- : 
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and : 
corporate, ~ 
Plaintiff, 
v. NC 74-42 
HORNBLOWER & WEEKS-HEMPHILL, 
NOYES, INC., : 
Defendant. : 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, : 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, : 
Plaintiff, : 
NC 74-43 
v. : 
LEHMAN BROTHERS, INC., 
Defendant. : 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, : 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, : 
Plaintiff, :
 N C 74_44 
v. : 
SHEARSON, HAMMILL & CO. INC., : 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SUTRO & CO. , INC. , 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH 
STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE 
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, a Utah 
body politic and corporate, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER 
& SMITH, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant. 
NC 74-45 
NC 74-46 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
MERRILL LYNCHfS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
AND ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON 
COUNTS I, II, III, IV AND V OF THE COMPLAINTS AND 
DISMISSING THE PENDENT CLAIMS BASED ON STATE LAW THEORIES 
Vernon B. Romney, Utah Attorney General and David L. 
Wilkinson, Assistant Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for plaintiff in all the above-entitled matters, and Richard W. 
Giauque and Brent M. Stevenson of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
and McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiffs in MC 74-46. 
Keith E. Taylor, Daniel M. Allred and Krege B. Christensen 
of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defend-
ants Bear, Stearns & Co., NC 74-38; Harris, Upham & Co. , Inc., 
NC 74-41; Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., NC 74-42; 
Lehman Brothers, Inc., NC 74-43; Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 
NC 74-44; Sutro & Co., Inc., NC 74-45; and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., NC 74-46. 
Parker M. Nielson of Salt Lake City, Utah, for defend-
ant Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., NC 74-39. 
Harold G. Christensen and R. Brent Stephens of Worsley, 
Snow & Christensen of Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant Bosworth, 
Sullivan & Company, Inc., NC 74-40. 
1/ 
On September 20, 19 74, plaintiff in the above-entitled 
matters filed suits against the nine named stock brokerage firms. 
As set out below, the cases arise from similar investment trans-
actions in the same investment program carried on by Utah State 
University [hereinafter the University] and in most cases the 
allegations in plaintiff's complaints and the defenses thereto 
2 / 
are identical. Although the cases have not been consolidated, 
they have been processed simultaneously and argued together, and 
this order will apply to all the cases as set out above. 
In these actions the plaintiff University seeks to recover 
losses arising out of certain investments it made in common stock 
through the various defendant brokerage firms. For a period of 
time subsequent to June, 1970, the then Assistant Vice President 
of Finance of the University and the University's investment 
officer, made numerous investments in securities on behalf of the 
University and executed such investments through various securi-
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ties brokerage houses in Utah and elsewhere, some of which 
are named as defendants in the actions herein. Many of the 
aforesaid investments were in common stocks, the market price 
of some of which declined markedly subsequent to the Univer-
sity^ investments, allegedly resulting in substantial loss 
to the University. 
On November 15, 1974, all the defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 8(e)(1), and 
A/ 
9(b) except defendant Merrill Lynch who, on that day, filed 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(c). These.motions were accompanied by memoranda 
in support thereof and the parties have filed extensive memo-
randa since that time; to wit, plaintiff filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the aforementioned motions on December 11, 19 74; 
defendants filed a reply memorandum in support of their motions 
on December 17, 1974; plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum 
in opposition on December 19, 19 74; and on February 4 and 11, 
19 75, the parties filed post-hearing memoranda in support of 
their respective positions. Oral argument was requested by all 
of the parties and was heard, with counsel for all of the 
parties present and participating, on January 29 and 30, 1975, 
at which time the matter was taken under advisement. On May 
5, 1975, the court filed an order allowing the parties to file 
affidavits or other supporting materials in support of certain 
factual allegations made in their motions and memoranda in 
order that the pending motions to dismiss could alternatively 
be treated by the court as motions for summary judgment pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
COUNTS I, II AND III OF THE COMPLAINTS. 
Counts I and II of each complaint allege violations of 
section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o-3, and of the National Association of Security Dealers 
£/ 
(hereinafter NASD) Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, § 1 and 
5/ 
§ 2 promulgated by NASD thereunder. Count III is similar in 
nature and*is based upon an alleged violation of section 6 of 
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f and upon Rule 405 ("Know-Your-
Customer Rule) of the New York Stock Exchange and Rule 411 of the 
American Stock Exchange (which is similar to said Rule 405), pro-
mulgated by the respective stock exchange thereunder. 
In State of Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., et al., CCH SEC. 
L. REP. 11 94,812, at 96,713 (D.C. Utah, October 1, 1974) (herein-
after cited as duPont), this court decided that a private right 
of action does not exist for the aggrieved customer to sue a 
broker-dealer in federal court for violation of a rule of one of 
the self-regulatory bodies to which the broker-dealer belongs. 
Counts I, II and III of all of the complaints, except the Merrill 
Lynch complaint, NC 74-46, are virtually identical, both in form 
and in substance, to the complaint in duPont. Therefore, based 
£/ 
upon the court's ruling in duPont, defendants1 motions to dis-
miss are hereby granted as to Counts I, II and III for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Counts I, II and III in the Merrill Lynch complaint are 
different from their counterparts in the other complaints in that 
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an allegation is made that the facts alleged in the first three 
counts also violate Rule 10b-5. It appears that plaintiffs in 
the Merrill Lynch complaint seek to buttress a Rule 10b-5 
claim with reference to the NASD and Stock Exchange Rules as 
these rules might bear upon the duty owed to the plaintiffs by 
defendants. Since the court has already ruled that alleged 
violations of these rules do not give rise to a private right 
of action, it is difficult to conceive what different result 
or advantage plaintiffs might seek, evidentiary or otherwise, 
by combining the alleged violations of the rules with a 10b-5 
claim. If the violation of the aforementioned rules cannot 
sustain a private right of action standing alone, it adds 
nothing to combine these allegations with alleged Rule 10b-5 
violations, especially when Count IV of the complaint alleges 
a separate Rule 10b-5 claim. Thus, for the reasons set forth 
above in regard to the unavailability of a private right of 
action under the aforementioned rules and with the reasons set 
forth below regarding the Rule 10b-5 count of the complaint, 
Counts I, II and III of the Merrill Lynch complaints, NC 74-46, 
are dismissed as being cumulative and redundant. 
COUNT IV ALLEGED RULE 10b-5 VIOLATIONS 
Count IV of each complaint alleges a violation of sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j (b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5. Count IV, in essence, alleges that defendant 
omitted to state certain material facts which were necessary 
in order to make the statements that the defendants did make, 
in connection with the purchase of securities by the plaintiff, 
not misleading. The alleged material omissions are the same 
allegations which are found in the first three counts of the 
complaints — the suitability claims against defendant under 
the NASD and Stock Exchange Rules. 
Omissions concerning the suitability of a stock are not 
the kind of omissions which give rise to Rule 10b-5 or any anti-
fraud liability. Professor Bromberg states: 
The embryonic requirement that a broker dealer's 
recommendation be "suitable" for his customers, 
primarily in terms of risk and their needs and 
situations, is a product of industry self-regulation. 
2/ 
Except for "boiler-shop" cases, it presently lies 
outside 10b-5 and other fraud rules. 1 BROMBERG, 
SECURITY LAWS: FRAUD, § 5.4, at 99-100 (1974), 
accord, VI L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 3720 
(Supp. 1969). 
The court has not been cited a case, nor has the court 
found a case, which has held on the merits that a broker-dealer's 
omissions concerning suitability of a stock is a basis for Rule 
10b-5 liability. Disregarding the suitability allegations in 
Count IV, which do not give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability, the 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Therefore, Counts IV of plaintiffs1 complaints are dismissed, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for the reasons set forth 
herein. r 
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REGULATIONS T AND X 
Except for the complaints against Lehman Brothers, 
Inc. and Sutro & Co., Inc., the University alleges in Count 
V of the complaints a violation of Regulation T of the 
Federal Reserve Board by defendants. The University further 
alleges that it maintained a special cash account with each 
of the defendants, and although it did not make payment with-
in 35 days from the trade date of certain enumerated purchase 
transactions, the defendants did not cancel the purchases or 
otherwise liquidate the University's accounts, nor did the 
defendants apply for an extension of time as required by Regu-
lation T. 
Regulation T, promulgated pursuant to section 7(c) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c), deter-
mines the initial minimum margin requirements that brokers and 
dealers may extend to their customers. Basically, a margin 
requirement is the amount of down payment required on any given 
security purchased on credit. When, as in these cases, a 
special cash account is used, the purchases or sales are essen-
£/ 
tially cash, nor credit transactions. If the cash, in the 
case of a purchase, is not deposited in the account within the 
1/ 
required time, the broker-dealer must, subject to certain 
limitations, liquidate the account. Thus, a Regulation T vio-
lation occurs most generally when the broker-dealer fails to 
make a timely liquidation. 
The main purpose behind section 7 of the 1934 Act, under 
which Regulation T was promulgated, was set forth in the report 
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: 
The main purpose of these margin provisions . . . 
is not to increase the safety of security loans 
for lenders. Banks and brokers normally require 
sufficient collateral to make themselves safe with-
out the help of law. Nor is the main purpose even 
protection of the small speculator by making it 
impossible for him to spread himself too thinly — 
although such a result will be achieved as a by-
product of the main purpose. 
The main purpose is to give a Government credit 
agency an effective method of reducing the aggre-
gate amount of the nationfs credit resources which 
can be directed by speculation into the stock 
market and out of other more desirable uses of 
commerce and industry—to prevent a recurrence of 
the pre-crash situation where funds which would 
otherwise have been available at normal interest 
rates for uses of local commerce, industry and 
agriculture, were drained by far higher rates 
into security loans and the New York call market. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). 
As seen from the foregoing, only secondarily was the interest of 
lenders-brokers and investors considered. 
While no civil remedy for margin violations exists under 
the 1934 Act, and even without the primary purpose of section 7 
being the protection of the investor, courts have nevertheless 
been willing to imply a private right of action for investors 
from a mere Federal Reserve Board regulation based on one of 
10/ 
three theories: tort, enforcement, or contract. Until recently 
the margin requirements, through Regulation T, were addressed exclu-
sively to those who extended credit in securities transactions and, 
consequently, in any transaction in which credit for the purchase 
of securities was involved, the lender had the burden of observ-
ing margin requirements. 
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In 1971, Congress amended section 7 of the 1934 Act 
to prohibit the receipt of loans by investors in violation 
11/ 
of the margin requirements. This legislation was imple-
mented through another Federal Reserve Board regulation, Regu-
lation X. Regulation X makes unlawful an investor's obtain-
ing of any credit in violation of the margin requirements; 
however, there is no violation if the borrower makes a good 
faith mistake and, upon discovery of the mistake, promptly 
12/ 
takes whatever steps necessary to remedy the non-compliance. 
In passing Title III of the Bank Records and Foreign 
Transactions Act, under which Regulation X was promulgated, 
Congress was concerned with deterring tax evasion and other 
13/ 
criminal activities. Regulation X has as its stated purpose: 
[T]o prevent the infusion of unregulated 
credit obtained both outside and within the 
United States securities markets in circumven-
tion of the provisions of the Boardfs margin 
regulations or by borrowers falsely certifying 
the purpose of a loan or otherwise wilfully and 
intentionally evading the provisions of those 
regulations.14/ 
Both Regulations T and X were promulgated under section 7 of the 
1934 Act and the purposes of both regulations are aimed at real-
izing or stabilizing a desirable macroeconomic goal of Congress 
rather than the protection of investors. 
While an implied right of action under Regulation T has 
been granted by some courts, the promulgation of Regulation X 
and the facts of this case put the issue of the interface of the 
two regulations directly before the court. Regarding the status 
of the private right of action in light of the interface, at 
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least four different results can be suggested: (1) The basis 
for a private damage action for violation of Regulation T has 
been undermined and canceled out by the amendment of section 
7 of the 193 4 Act and the promulgation of Regulation X there-
under for the reason that in the past under Regulation T the 
broker shouldered the entire responsibility for compliance with 
the margin requirements, but Regulation X now puts the respon-
sibility equally upon the investor. (2) The private right of 
action survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation 
X; however, Regulation X provides an in. pari delicto or equal 
fault defense in an action by an investor that the court or 
jury can manipulate in making a determination as to the degree 
of culpability of each party. (3) The private right of action 
survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation X, unless 
the investor has wilfully and intentionally tried to evade the 
15/ 
provisions of the margin requirements. (4) The private right 
of action survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation 
X and a broker can expose himself to almost strict liability for 
a violation of Regulation T for the reason that someone should 
be saddled with the responsibility of assuring compliance with 
the margin requirements and the broker is in the best posture 
to do this. The in. pari delicto defense would be denied under 
this approach for the reason that private suits serve an import-
ant enforcement function and this enforcement purpose would dis-
allow an in pari delicto defense in the securities area as it 
16/ 
has been disallowed in the antitrust area. 
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The court is of the opinion that, as -outlined in the 
first alternative, the promulgation of Regulation X has 
removed the necessary legal underpinning for implying a pri-
vate right of action for a violation of the margin require-
ments, and that Regulation X cancels out the private right of 
action implied under Regulation T. As a matter of law, there-
fore, Count V in the complaints which alleges a violation of 
Regulation T should be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. Further, however, the court 
is of the opinion that motions for summary judgment would have 
to be granted in favor of defendants for other reasons under 
the facts of these cases. 
Most private actions under Regulation T have been brought 
in tort on the rationale that where a defendant's violation of 
a prohibitory statute has caused injury to the plaintiff, the 
latter has a right of action if one of the purposes of the en-
actment is to protect interests similar to those of the plain-
tiffs. The implication of a private right of action under 
Regulation T was based upon an enactment and a regulation pro-
mulgated thereunder, neither of which had as their purpose the 
protection of the investor. To find a basis on which to predi-
cate liability under Regulation T, a secondary effect of shield-
ing the investor from spreading his resources too thinly has 
11/ 
been recognized. In light of the amendment to section 7 of 
the 1934 Act by Congress and the promulgation of Regulation X 
thereunder, it appears tenuous to continue to elevate what the 
report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
_ i -*_ 
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characterized as a "by-product11 effect into a "purpose" of 
the enactment and then to imply from this implied purpose a 
private right of action for an investor, who now, like the 
lender,violates the law by carrying securities with the credit 
obtained in a transaction involving a Regulation T violation. 
In 19 70 when Congress considered and amended the margin provi-
sions in section 7 of the 1934 Act, a private remedy could have 
been provided at that time. Instead, however, Congress dealt 
only with countering secret foreign financing in circumvention 
of the margin regulations. Commenting on the policy implica-
tions of Regulation X, the court in S.E.C. v. Packer, Wilbur & 
Co., Inc., 362 F.Supp. 510, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) stated: "The 
clear import of Regulation X is that Congress was determined 
not to limit the burden of compliance to brokers alone but 
rather extended it to customers as well." 
The court, under the circumstances, credits Congress with 
adequate insight to provide enforcement of its own enactments. 
When Congress, with the knowledge that for years a private right 
of action had been implied by some courts under section 7 of the 
1934 Act, amends the section in a manner which directly under-
cuts the legal basis upon which the private right of action was 
grounded and fails to directly authorize a private right, it 
would seem pretentious for this court to expand an area of 
federal law so recently considered by Congress by "implying" a 
private damage action for those guilty of margin violations 
under the law. For these reasons, the court holds that a private 
right of action no longer exists under Regulation T due to the 
- 1 A -
amendment to section 7 of the 1934 Act which resulted in the 
19/ 
promulgation of Regulation X. Therefore, Counts V of 
plaintiff's complaints are dismissed. 
The court further observes that even if it be argued 
that a private right of action should still be implied in the 
face of Regulation X, the authorities do not support such an 
implication on behalf of an institutional investor as in this 
case. As Judge Friendly observed in a persuasive dissent in 
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2nd Cir. 
1970), cert, denied. 401 U.S. 1013 (1971): 
To be- sure, it may be proper in some instances 
to impose civil liability in furtherance of the 
subsidiary purpose of § 7(c), protection of the 
innocent "lamb" attracted to speculation by the 
possibility of large profits with low capital 
investment. . . . Pearlstein, an experienced 
speculator, was no lamb, and the trial judge 
specifically found that he was not induced to 
enter into the transactions by any expectation 
that defendant would be slow in selling him out 
if he were to default in payment. 
The University, an institutional investor (and an agency 
of the sovereign) which must operate under guidelines established 
by statutes, regulations and rules, engaged itself in a far-
flung, wide-ranging investment program in common stocks which 
it now asserts it had no authority to do. Neither the main 
purpose of section 7(c) — e.g.,". . . to prevent a recurrence 
of the pre-crash situation where funds which would otherwise 
have been available at normal interest rates for use of local 
20/ 
commerce, industry and agriculture. . . . " — nor the secondary 
purpose — e.g., the " . . . protection of the small speculator 
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by making it impossible for him to spread himself too thinly 
21/ 
. . ." — are served by implying a private right of action 
under the facts of this case. The funds that were invested 
by the University would not, directly at least, *be available 
to support local commerce, industry and agriculture, nor can 
the University be said to be the "small speculator" concerning 
whom Congress might have had secondary concern in making it 
impossible to spread itself too thinly. A threshold require-
ment of serving or forwarding the public purposes of section 
7(c) of the 1934 Act must be met before a private right of 
action for civil liability can be implied thereunder. The 
rationale that argues for implying a private right of action 
for a financially strong institutional investor under either 
the primary or secondary purpose of section 7(c) hangs from a 
thin, fragmented thread. The court is unaware of any authority 
under which private civil liability should be implied or sus-
tained in this case. 
Lastly, even if a private right of action should still 
be implied in the face of Regulation X and the other considera-
tions set out above, at the very least, Regulation X would pro-
vide an in pari delicto or equal fault defense which would sus-
tain a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants under 
the facts of this case. Regulation X makes the University 
equally responsible and liable with the defendants for the 
alleged margin violations. Ignorance of the law is generally 
no defense when charged with its violation; however, in this 
_1 £-
regard, the University cannot be characterized as unknow-
ledgeable with regard to the requisites of Regulation X when 
it had ready access to legal counsel and also had available 
to it the experience and manpower of the office of the Utah 
Attorney General, itself a law enforcement agency, charged 
with advising various state agencies concerning the exercise 
of their powers. It is interesting to observe that the court 
has not been advised that the University took advantage of 
that portion of Regulation X which allows a purchaser to cor-
rect a non-compliance by promptly taking whatever remedial 
22/ 
steps are necessary upon discovery of the violation. At best, 
therefore, the plaintiff's theory is novel, in that it seeks to 
selectively rescind and be made whole on all its loss trans-
actions while keeping the benefits of its gain transactions. 
The court is unaware of any authority which would allow such a 
favorable remedy to a plaintiff who is equally guilty of viola-
tion of the regulation under which liability would be imposed 
against the defendant. Neither justice nor reason provide 
grounds on which to sustain a cause of action for the Univer-
sity's theory under all the circumstances of this case. 
PENDENT CLAIMS BASED ON STATE LAW 
In State of Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., et al., CCH 
SEC. L. REP. 1(94,812, at 96,713 (D.C. Utah, October 1, 1974), 
the court was concerned with the pendent state law claims, and 
the court's observations therein expressed are equally appli-
cable again in these cases. In United Mine Workers of America 
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v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) the Supreme Court held that as 
a matter of constitutional power, pendent federal jurisdiction 
exists whenever state and federal claims "derive from a common 
nucleus of operative fact" and are such that a plaintiff 
"would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial 
proceeding." Id. at 725. The Court, however, stated further 
in this regard: 
That .power need not be exercised in every case in 
which it is found to exist. It has consistently 
been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a 
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. 
Its justification lies in considerations of judi-
cial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants; if these are not present a federal court 
should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state 
claims, even though bound to apply state law to 
them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. Need-
less decisions of state law should be avoided both 
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between 
the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed 
reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the 
federal claims are dismissed before trial, even 
though not insubstantial in a. jurisdictional sense, 
the state claims should be dismissed as well. 
Similarly, if it appears that the state issues 
substantially predominate, whether in terms of 
proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of 
the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the 
state claims may be dismissed without prejudice 
and left for resolution to state tribunals. Id. 
at 726-27. (Emphasis added.) 
These cases present a clear instance where state claims should 
be dismissed now that the determination has been made that there 
is no federal claim. The federal claims have been dismissed 
before trial. The remaining pendent claims involve complicated 
questions necessitating the construction of a morass of seem-
ingly conflicting state statutes in order to determine the scope 
of power and authority of a state institution to invest in common 
stocks. This is a classic instance when "needless decisions 
of state law should be avoided . . . as a matter of comity 
. . . by procuring . . . a surer-footed reading of applicable 
law." Id. at 726. 
It is appropriate to observe that the court is advised 
that by virtue of a state court suit brought by the University 
many of the issues involved in the pendent claims are on appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court. It should be the primary right of 
the Stdte Supreme Court to construe the state statutes 
involved in these pendent claims. It would be abortive for 
this court to decide questions so fundamentally fraught with 
state interests when the issues are on appeal before the Utah 
court. Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasons, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Merrill Lynchfs 
iy 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and all other defendants' 
24/ 
motions to dismiss on Counts I, II, III, IV and V of the com-
plaints are granted for failing to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, and plaintiff's complaints are dismissed, 
along with the causes of action based thereon, and the remain-
25/ 
ing state law pendent claims are dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 1975. 
/s/ ALDON J. ANDERSON 
ALDON J. ANDERSON 
United States District Judge 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The University is the sole plaintiff in each of the actions 
with the exception of the suit filed against Merrill Lynch, NC 
74-46, in which case the State of Utah is also named as a party 
plaintiff. A reference herein to the "University" or to the 
"plaintiff" is intended to embrace both plaintiffs in NC 74-46. 
2. Each case has the same variety except NC 74-43 and NC 74-45 
which do not have a count based upon the alleged violation of 
Regulation T, promulgated by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System under Section 7(a) and (c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
3. The motion to dismiss of defendant Bosworth, Sullivan & 
Co., Inc., was filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) only. 
4. This rule provides: 
"A member, in the conduct of his business, shall 
observe high standards of commercial honor and 
just and equitable principles of trade." 
5. This is the NASD "suitability rule" which states that: "In 
recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of 
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon 
the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as 
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situa-
tion and needs." 
6. All defendants are contemplated except Merrill Lynch in 
NC 74-46. 
7. "Boiler room" or "boiler-shop" is a high pressure sales 
campaign conducted by telephone. See VI L. LOSS, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 3708 (Supp. 1969). 
8. 12 C.F.R. §220.4 (1973). 
9. The required time in the case of a purchase through a 
special cash account is seven business days. 12 C.F.R. §220.4 
(c)(ii)(2) (1973). However, as in this case, if payment is to 
be made against the delivery of the security by the broker, 
the required period may be extended to thirty-five days. 12 
C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (ii) (5) (1973). 
10. See Note, In pari delicto as a Defense to Violations of 
Margin Legislation under the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, 9 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 113, 118-19 (1974); Note, 
Regulation X: A Complexis, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 136 (1974). 
-20-
11. BANK RECORDS & FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS ACT OF ,1970, TITLE 
III, 84 Stat. 1124, 15 U.S.C* § 78g(f)(l) (1971). 
12. 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1973). 
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 975 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970). 
14. 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1973). 
15. The first paragraph of Regulation X states its purpose as 
follows: " 
[T]o prevent the infusion of unregulated credit 
obtained both outside and within the United States 
securities markets in circumvention of the provi-
sions of the Board's margin regulations or by 
borrowers falsely certifying the purpose of a loan 
or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading 
the provisions of those regulations. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 224.1 (1973). (Emphasis added.) 
The court reads this provision in two parts. The first part 
(ending at the first conjunction "or") explains the purpose of 
Regulation X in terms of preventing the infusion of unregulated 
credit, the mere circumvention of the margin regulations. The 
second part (following the first conjunction "or") speaks of 
preventing the false certification of the purpose of a loan, and 
the phrase "or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading" is 
thought to refer only to "falsely certifying the purpose of a 
loan." 
To conclude that an investor need not have a wilful intent to 
evade the margin requirements in order to violate Regulation X 
is consistent both with the obvious construction of the stated 
purpose of the regulation as herein explained and with the tenor 
of Regulation T and the federal securities fraud laws which do 
not require wilfulness in order to show a violation. 
16. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 
293 U.S. 134, 138 (1968). 
17. Remars v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F.Supp. 1014, 1017 
(D. Mass. 1949). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 1383, infra note 18, 
in which deterring the investor from spreading himself too thinly 
was seen as a "by-product" of the main purpose of the regulation. 
18. The report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce stated: 
The main purpose of these margin provisions . . . 
is not to increase the safety of security loans 
for lenders. Banks and brokers normally require 
sufficient collateral to make themselves safe with-
out the help of law. Nor is the main purpose even 
protection of the small speculator by making it 
impossible for him to spread himself too thinly— 
although such a will be achieved as a 
by-product of the main purpose. H.R. Rep. No. 
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). 
19. The court is aware of the leading Regulation T decision 
of the Second Circuit, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 
F.2d 1136 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) 
which concluded that the disadvantages of giving the "un-
scrupulous" plaintiff a windfall recovery were outweighed by 
the "salutary policing effect" a private cause of action would 
have upon broker-dealers. Id. at 1141. The Pearlstein deci-
sion rejected the defense of in. pari delicto in a suit alleg-
ing violation of Regulation T. However, the reasoning employed 
for that conclusion has been undermined by the subsequent enact-
ment of Regulation X. The Pearlstein Court, as analogous autho-
rity, specifically referred to the antitrust decision of Perma 
Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134 (1968), which 
had rejected the _in pari delicto defense in the antitrust area. 
In expanding on that analogy, the Second Circuit pointed out 
that 
[a]lthough Perma Life would apparently continue 
to deny recovery to plaintiffs who had not been 
coerced but who had benefited from the arrange-
ment equally with the defendant, such a defense 
does not appear desirable in the securities area 
here involved, even when the investor may be shown 
to have had knowledge of margin requirements. Un-
like the antitrust laws which forbid both seller 
and buyer to enter into a proscribed transaction, 
the federally imposed margin requirements forbid 
a broker to extend undue credit but do not forbid 
customers from accepting such credit. 429 F.2d 
at 1141. 
The premise of that position—that buyers are not prohibited from 
entering into improper margin transactions—has been overruled by 
Regulation X. Thus, the primary ground of the Pearlstein argu-
ment for rejecting the iri pari delicto defense in Regulation T 
cases is no longer valid. In addition, the analogy to the pri-
vate policing policy of antitrust laws is weak at best, since 
those statutes specifically provide for private civil actions 
and encourage private enforcement actions by the treble damages 
provisions. In contrast, no such Congressional imprimatur 
exists for private actions under Regulation T. Thus, antitrust 
cases such as Perma Life are inappropriate authority in this 
case for rejecting the i.n pari delicto defense, or even for the 
importance of a private right of action. 
In Pearlstein Judge Friendly dissented on the grounds that the 
holding would encourage customers to violate the margin rules. 
429 F.2d 1148. A similar argument could be made against the : 
court's holding in the instant case; that is, by abolishing a 
private right of action altogether, the incentive to comply 
with margin requirements is reduced for both broker-dealers 
and customers andf as a consequence, "devil's bargains" might 
result, depending upon the probabilities of detection through 
public enforcement. The court believes, however, that the 
potential for this kind of abuse is diminished by the current 
disinclination of broker-dealers to jeopardize their public 
image, their relationship with the SEC, and their standing 
among other broker-dealers in the industry. There are a suffi-
cient number of other enforcement avenues of the regulations 
in question. 
20. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d'Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). 
21. Id. 
22. 12 C.P.R. § 224.6(a) (1973). 
23. The court is aware that a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings is theoretically directed towards a determination 
of the substantive merits of a controversy, but that it also 
has an incidental function under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (h)(2) of 
permitting certain procedural defects, as in this case— a 
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted—to be reaised after the close of the pleadings. 5 
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1369, 
at 701 (1969). The court, therefore, considers defendant 
Merrill Lynch1s motion for judgment on the pleadings to be 
essentially in the same procedural posture as the other defend-
ants1 motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b) (6) . 
24. Although affidavits and other supporting materials have 
been filed by the respective parties, the court elects to 
ground its holding herein on the defendants1 original motions 
to dismiss. 
25. The court has noted the suggestion of plaintiff's counsel 
in its brief that for the reason that this court has previously 
upheld identical 10b-5 counts in the duPont complaint (NC 74-9) 
and in the Merrill Lynch complaint (NC 7 4-4 6) , that amendment 
to the complaint might be allowed if the court had question as 
to the sufficiency of the 10b-5 counts. Plaintiff's arguments 
in this regard are not well taken and they inaccurately repre-
sent this court's prior rulings. In duPont, the defendant filed 
a motion to dismiss all counts in the complaint and the motion 
was granted only in respect to Counts I, II and III, which 
were the "suitability" counts as in the instant cases. However, 
when the defendant in duPont filed its motion to dismiss as to 
all counts, the complaint did not at that time contain a 10b-5 
count. Plaintiff amended the complaint to include the 10b-5 
count after the motion to dismiss was filed. The sufficiency 
of the 10b-5 count in duPont was never briefed, argued, or con-
sidered by the court. Further, the court has never ruled on 
the viability of the 10b-5 count in the Merrill Lynch complaint. 
Counts I, II and III in the Merrill Lynch complaint are, as 
the court has previously stated in this order, different from 
their counterparts in the other complaints in that they are 
bottomed on alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 as well as on 
alleged violations of the stock exchange rules in question. 
In this court's order of October 11, 1974, in the Merrill 
Lynch case, a motion to dismiss these three counts, on the 
grounds that a private right of action does not exist, was 
denied. In that order the court merely held that it read the 
complaint to allege a 10b-5 claim, rather than a claim based 
solely on the stock exchange rules. Today the court has con-
sidered the sufficiency of those three counts and has deter-
mined that they should be dismissed, among other reasons, as 
being cumulative and redundant since Count IV of the Merrill 
Lynch complaint also alleges a 10b-5 violation. Supra at 7. 
In view of the fact that plaintiff has chosen to stand on the 
10b-5 pleading in its present form by not seeking opportunity 
to amend prior to the disposition of the motions to dismiss, 
and after now considering the nine complaints herein and the 
extensive briefinf and argument in pretrial motions in which 
the court has not been advised nor become aware of even an 
oblique reference to any additional facts that might be pleaded 
in order to state a claim in this regard, amendment at this 
juncture appears futile. See Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 
182 (1962). For these reasons, the court does not construe 
plaintiff's suggestion that amendment might be allowed as a 
motion for leave to amend. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
a Utah body politic and 
corporate, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BEAR, STEARNS & CO., a corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
NC 74-38 
On October 18, 1974, plaintiff in the above-entitled 
matter filed a set of interrogatories upon the defendant. A 
series of objections and responses followed, including a motion 
to compel answers filed by the plaintiff on December 2, 1974. 
On May 8, 1975, plaintiff's counsel notified the court by letter 
that its motion to compel had not been ruled upon and requested 
that discovery now be allowed in view of the pending motion for 
summary judgment in this matter. The request for discovery, while 
appropriate, is mooted by the court's ruling this day in another 
order that there is no cause of action stated. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to compel 
is denied. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 1975. 
/s/ Aldon J. Anderson 
ALDON J. ANDERSON 
United States District Judge 
